Tuesday, April 01, 2025

VENEZUELA, IRAN, RUSSIA, USA: A DANGEROUS "COCKTAIL"

El Taladro Azul  Published  Originally in Spanish in  LA GRAN ALDEA

M. Juan Szabo and Luis A. Pacheco   



The Trump presidency has been dynamic and disruptive in its first months, attracting significant media attention in US domestic politics and worldwide. His politicized and confrontational leadership style has kept him at the center of news coverage.


Trump has been the predominant actor in recent weeks regarding the oil market. For example, the harsh trade war of tariff impositions carried out by the White House occupant could reduce global oil demand. In parallel, an executive order from the US administration has toughened oil sanctions against Venezuela, imposing secondary sanctions on Venezuelan crude buyers. 


Additionally, compliance with oil sanctions against Iran has been strengthened, freezing the flow of Iranian crude to China. These actions could significantly reduce the crude supply in the market, generating a bullish perception reflected in this week's trading.


VENEZUELA

THE NOOSE TIGHTENS

After nearly a decade of irrelevance in the oil market, Venezuela returns to the spotlight in a scenario of strangulation of its oil sector that depends, in the short term, more on the actions of external actors than on what the Venezuelan regime can or cannot do. 


The cancellation and subsequent extension of licenses for oil operations in Venezuela, particularly for Chevron, Repsol, Global Oil Terminals, and Maurel & Prom, which represent around 30% of the country's total production, along with an executive order from President Trump that would impose tariffs on products from countries that buy Venezuelan crude, would seem to constitute a stranglehold on the Venezuelan economy. It should be remembered that the main foundation of the country's economy is its ability to generate foreign currency by selling its hydrocarbons.


Nevertheless, there are always various interpretations of events and angles that may go unnoticed. This combination of American threats, like a pressure vise, must be evaluated in the context of that country's renewed efforts to enforce sanctions on Iran's oil exports, a stagnant US oil industry, uncertainty in international reactions to the war of tariffs, and secondary tariffs, and the obstacles encountered in seeking a resolution to the military conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. This geopolitical and economic framework, multivariable and unpredictable, makes it difficult to determine a single outcome.


It seems easy to deduce that the objective of this combination of reinstating sanctions on multinational oil activities in Venezuela and the executive order imposing secondary tariffs on Venezuelan crude buyers is to exert maximum pressure, this time in the form of an economic blockade. If the blockade were to be effective, the regime would be without a good part of its foreign currency income. What is less clear, or at least public, is the final objective of the Trump administration in Venezuela.


In practice, the results of the coercive measures against Venezuela depend on the reaction of countries confronted with secondary tariffs and also on the rigor and effectiveness of the White House in giving coherence with other existing tariffs in the framework of those countries' trade relations with the US. Each country’s positioning will reflect its commercial interest, generally a function of the magnitude of trade and the geopolitical stance each country wants or can take against the US, particularly in the Venezuelan case.


We observe, for instance,  that India does not seem willing to pay the additional 25% tariff on its products, nor does it plan to antagonize the world's leading power. According to a Reuters report, the Indian oil company Reliance will cease purchasing Venezuelan oil after receiving the shipment that is currently in transit. It is also reported that Repsol (Spain), ENI (Italy), and Maurel et Prom (France) will be notified that their licenses or comfort letters will be revoked.


The position of China could be very different. Hitherto, the Chinese government has been cautious not to acquire sanctioned crude nor allow tankers sanctioned by the US in its ports; hence, all the transshipments, name changes, intermediate sales, and other maneuvers that have had to be used to maintain a relatively constant flow of Venezuelan crude to Chinese refineries. However, regarding the executive order, which would impose a 25% tariff on the enormous flow of products to the US for relatively insignificant crude purchases, the reaction may not be purely economic. 


Chia has already protested the executive order's nature, and it will probably be the first and perhaps only geopolitical negotiation that Secretary of State Rubio will have to make on this matter. Several VLCCs (very large crude carriers) are on their way to the port of Jose or are anchored nearby, waiting to load Venezuelan heavy crude for delivery to China.


Spain complained about the measure and threatened to take retaliatory measures. Still, for now, the tanker heading to Venezuela was diverted and did not reach the port of Jose, indicating that most countries are unwilling to expose all their trade with the US to the threat of secondary tariffs.

Of course, the limitations on placing Venezuelan hydrocarbons will be reflected in production levels once storage capacity in the country, on land or floating, is used up. Venezuela exports over seven hundred thousand barrels per day (700 Mbpd) of oil and refined products destined for China, the US, India, Spain, and Cuba.


The attached graph shows four possible export-level outcomes according to the effect of US measures, assuming their enforcement starts on April 2.




*Own calculations



In the first case, exports would remain at similar levels to current ones while the "wind down" period of the licenses remains in effect. Upon termination of Chevron's activities, as established in License 41-B, and with minimal placement in other markets, exports would be reduced by about 270 Mbpd. Likewise, canceling other OFAC licenses and comfort letters would have an additional negative impact. The last column shows the export component that does not generate income for the regime; therefore, we could assume it is outside the sanctions.


In an extreme case (unlikely, but not impossible) where the measures manage to reduce exports to minimal levels, a large part of the production would have to be shut down due to a lack of storage capacity and diluent for the mixture of Merey-16 and DCO grades; this would mean a de facto oil embargo, with catastrophic adverse effects on the economy, the general population, and the political stability of the regime.


Some analysts maintain that production under OFAC licenses continues until April 2, when the "wind down" process begins, that is, the dismantling of operations carried out by international companies. Volumes produced after that date and until May 27 will not be considered protected by the licenses. This is not very clear yet.


The volumes considered as reductions in each of the graph's columns could be redirected to destinations that disregard secondary tariffs or could be totally or partially exempted from sanctions through bilateral negotiations in the "Richard Grenell" style on matters of returning illegal immigrants, releasing American prisoners, and some points of "commercial coincidence," to call it something. Whether these negotiations include political issues or the crux of the Venezuelan problem is also possible.

So these results, whatever the level of crude production/export and the products that result, make up a highly recessionary scenario that will deepen the country's economic problems. These problems have been dragging on for almost two decades and have worsened with the mere announcement of these recent policies.


Indeed, the regime has tried to mitigate the deterioration of the currency without success. At the end of the week, the Bs./$ exchange rate shot up to above 100 Bs./$, while the official rate was artificially restricted, approaching 70 Bs/$, a gap of 49%. The availability of foreign currency for the exchange market, through different mechanisms, remains low. As in the previous month, public spending continues at abnormally reduced levels, and bank credit is non-existent. This combination determines the deterioration of the economy, feeding the already known vicious circle of falling GDP, devaluation of the currency, and increasing inflation.


While all this is taking place in Venezuela, we should note the visit of Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Guyana and the Caribbean as the Trump administration intensifies its commitment in the Western Hemisphere to promote energy independence and curb illegal migration, drug trafficking, and gang violence. Particularly, in Guyana, Secretary Rubio promised that the US would respond forcefully if Venezuela attacked Guyana amid the territorial dispute between the two countries.


On the domestic front, the regime has taken the repatriation from the US of illegal immigrants as a political flag. It speaks of welcoming with open arms the compatriots that the "Yankee imperialism" has mistreated. In the case of those deported to El Salvador, under the presumption that they are members of the gang called "Tren de Aragua," the regime has raised a protest for the violation of these Venezuelans' right to due process and to have firm sentences before imprisoning them. This moral posing is a crass irony since, in Venezuela, there are hundreds of civilian and military prisoners who have been waiting for years without being tried and without due judicial process.


Regarding the general elections, scheduled for May, the complications of the moment favor a postponement. The "functional opposition" continues campaigning to insist on the convenience of voting without mentioning the fraud of the elections of July 28 last year and ignoring the regime's current weakness in the face of the sanctions, as discussed above.


OIL OPERATIONS

Venezuela is in the midst of a new electricity crisis, especially in the western part of the country, mainly due to the low levels of the reservoirs in the Andes, coupled with the low availability of thermoelectric generation and limitations in the transmission system to bring electricity from Guri. As a result of this crisis, the regime has decreed a reduced work schedule for all non-critical public dependencies, including parts of PDVSA and its subsidiaries. The new workday in public administration is three days a week, for four and a half hours per day—an attempt to put the country to sleep in the face of the crises it has created.


Two accidents in the production fields were reported during the week:

  • On March 25, an oil service barge, the Cristi Bay, exploded in Lake Maracaibo, causing the death of three workers and at least six injured. The vessel, owned by Servicios y Obras Sudamericana C.A. (SOSCA), sank after the explosion. That same company suffered a similar accident a few months ago, with the sinking of the Chantise G barge, in which another six workers died. They were carrying out work for EM PetroZamora.
  • At the Jose complex, in the eastern part of the country, at the EM PetroCedeño upgrading plant, which currently produces an intermediate stream for feeding the refining complex in Paraguaná, there was a significant leak of poisonous H₂S gas. This gas is difficult to disperse because it is heavier than air. Fortunately, no one was reported affected despite the seriousness of the accident.



Crude production during the last week averaged eight hundred and seventy-two thousand barrels per day (872 MBPD), geographically distributed as follows:

  • West 224 (Chevron 106)
  • East 128
  • Orinoco Belt 520 (Chevron 120)
  • TOTAL 872 (Chevron 226)

National refineries processed 220 Mbpd of crude and intermediate products, yielding 80 Mbpd of gasoline and 76 Mbpd of diesel.


The average sale price of barrels marketed under OFAC licenses, net of debt payment, was $51.4/bbl, and the weighted average of all exports was $33.53/bbl. To date, no activity indicative of cessation of operations by licensed companies has been observed. Crude shipments under licenses are proceeding normally, and there is no reason why they should not continue to do so until the "wind down" period of each license begins.


As such, exports to the US are expected to reach 270 Mbpd in March. To China, it could come close to 320 Mbpd, and to India, 66 Mbpd. Reliance, the Indian company, has already announced that, after receiving the shipment in transit, it will suspend the purchase of Venezuelan crude until the situation of sanctions is clarified. Spain will receive 33 Mbpd; the last tanker was diverted before arriving at Jose, as we mentioned earlier. The Spanish government speaks of defending Repsol's rights in Venezuela.


CITGO

In Delaware, a US federal judge faces new disputes between creditors while trying to advance with the auction of shares of PDV Holding, the parent company of the Citgo Petroleum refinery.

  • The auction seeks to pay 18 creditors for defaults and expropriations by Venezuela and PDVSA.
  • The process was restarted in January after a previous auction failed, where a $7.3 billion offer from Elliott Investment Management was rejected.
  • The judicial official in charge of the process (special master) recommended a minimum bid of $3.7 billion from Red Tree Investment (a subsidiary of Contrarian Funds) as a "stalking horse.”


This latest court strategy seeks to unravel a judicial case that is already more than eight years old and originates in the expropriation actions and debts of the administrations of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. The probability that this strategy will succeed seems low, especially because Red Tree's offer links the case in Delaware with the case of PDVSA 2020 bonds in New York, of which Contrarian Funds is also a part. Elliott Investment Management protested the court official's recommendation and requested access to the sealed agreement to pay Venezuelan bondholders.



FUNDAMENTALS

Oil fundamentals gave the market a sense of calm, discarding several news items that do not have the entity to cause justified price volatility. The relative stability of the US oil business, virtually constant drilling activity worldwide, and announcements of production openings and monthly compensation for overproduction by OPEC+ have served as mitigating agents to the volatility of oil prices. Commercial crude inventories in the US, reported by the EIA, show a drop of 3.3 million barrels despite an increase in imports of more than 5 million barrels of crude. Distillate and gasoline inventories also showed a slight decline.


Global demand continues to rise according to forecasts; even the latest IEA report makes a rare upward adjustment. Meanwhile, supply growth remains lagging, mainly due to the general decline in production increases in Brazil and Canada. Thus, the gap between demand and supply remains relatively constant.

Talks to resume Kurdish oil exports through the pipeline between Iraq and Turkey remain stalled due to disagreements over payments and contracts. Negotiations, initiated in February, have not yet resolved the nearly two-year blockade that halts flows from Iraqi Kurdistan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, delaying a scheduled increase of one hundred thousand barrels per day of crude to the market.


Market catalysts are feeding on the complex geopolitical mix of sanctions, tariffs, customer redistribution, and reactive actions. The engine of all this new form of oil market control is in Washington, and it is an integral part of the conception of redistribution of world powers that moves the White House and seeks to resolve the wars that today affect economies and unbalance the traditional forms of oil trade and their supply lines.


GEOPOLITICS

Russia and Ukraine agreed to a tentative agreement, mediated by the United States, to pause attacks on energy infrastructure and navigation in the Black Sea; however, Moscow then made new demands on the Black Sea agreement. Both parties quickly accused each other of violations. In any case, this highlights the challenges of negotiating a broader peace in that conflict.


French President Emmanuel Macron organized a European summit in which plans to deploy troops in Ukraine were considered to consolidate a possible peace agreement. However, hours after the summit, Vladimir Putin declared that Russia would not accept any troops from NATO members as part of a possible peacekeeping force. Macron and other participants in the Paris summit accused Russia of only pretending to want a negotiated solution. Keir Starmer indicated that "Russia is playing and winning time, we cannot allow them to prolong this while they continue with their illegal invasion."


Additionally, Vladimir Putin proposed putting Ukraine under a temporary government under the umbrella of the UN as part of the conditions for reaching a peaceful solution to the war, an enthusiastic statement that reflected the Russian's determination to achieve his war objectives. Putin affirmed that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, whose mandate expired last year, lacks the legitimacy to sign a peace agreement and that any agreement signed with the current Ukrainian government could be challenged by his successors. This suggestion had already been rejected by Washington and European leaders and also, as expected, has received a similar response from the UN itself. The secretary general of the organization, António Guterres, affirmed today that Ukraine has a legitimate government that must be respected.


On the other hand, Ukrainian officials stated on Friday that the terms of an agreement that grants Washington a share in the profits of the extraction and export of Ukraine's abundant minerals have not yet been finalized. However, a summary of the proposals, accessed by the Reuters news agency, showed that the US demanded all of Ukraine's natural resource revenues for years, until Ukraine had reimbursed the cost of all US aid during the war, plus interest. Zelensky reiterated that he accepts the idea of some US participation in the income from exploiting Ukraine's natural resources but will not agree to anything that impoverishes his country.

In the other neuralgic focus, in the Middle East, Israel carried out its first major air strike on the southern suburbs of Beirut in months on Friday, in retaliation for the launch of a missile from Lebanon, in the most serious test of the unstable ceasefire agreed in November.

Regarding Gaza, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz warned Hamas that Israel will maintain a permanent presence in parts of Gaza unless the hostages in Gaza are released and that he had instructed the army "to occupy additional areas in Gaza, while evacuating the population, and to expand the security zones around Gaza to protect Israeli communities and IDF soldiers through the permanent maintenance of the territory by Israel."


The US bombed Houthi targets in Yemen again. Aerial recordings indicate that the target was the army headquarters, occupied by the Houthis. This episode has created a mini political crisis in Washington, as it became known that security officials were distributing information about the attack through an unsecured application.


OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

The indirect activities derived from the requirement to comply with sanctions against Iranian oil exports have had notable effects. At least eleven VLCC tankers with Iranian crude have been stranded in Malaysian territorial waters, and floating storage in the area has increased to 18 million barrels, evidence that Chinese refineries continue to postpone their purchases while evaluating the impact of US sanctions. Iran's Oil Minister, Mohsen Paknejad, has declared that the Trump administration’s new sanctions and enforcement efforts against Iran's energy exports have not significantly impacted.


On the issue of logistical control of the Panama Canal, a priority for President Trump, it had been agreed that the Hong Kong conglomerate CK Hutchison would sell its port concessions on both sides of the canal to a BlackRock subsidiary. The definitive documentation was expected to be signed on April 2. However, the signing was postponed and is pending the Chinese government's review of the operation's convenience.



PRICE DYNAMICS

The potential effect of removing relevant volumes of crude from Iran and Venezuela from the market due to US sanctions policies, a demand that seems consistent in its growth, and the general increase in geopolitical risks continue to give reasons for the market to maintain a bullish mood for now. However, prices had setbacks to maintain gains during the week due to macroeconomic uncertainty related to the interaction between sanctions and tariffs.


So the market had another week with slight gains, 2% compared to the previous week. At the close of the markets on Friday, March 28, 2025, the benchmark crude oils Brent and WTI were quoted at $73.63/bbl and $69.36/bbl, respectively.

 

Tuesday, March 25, 2025

SANCTIONS ON IRAN AND OPEC+ DECISIONS MOVE PRICES

El Taladro Azul  Published  Originally in Spanish in  LA GRAN ALDEA

M. Juan Szabo and Luis A. Pacheco  

U.S. pressure on Iranian oil exports and the recent announcement by OPEC+ members about oversupply compensation plans just before beginning to eliminate voluntary production cuts gradually indicate a less robust supply and, therefore, support a moderate recovery in oil prices. In contrast, the Federal Reserve and the complex negotiations for a partial ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine have not altered the oil market, which remains indifferent to speculations about unresolved events. Possible interruptions in production flows in some countries could generate additional upward pressures on prices if they persist.


FUNDAMENTALS

Market fundamentals have regained prominence in the oil market dynamics in recent days. OPEC+, news from China and India, and various supply disruptions have configured a scenario that prints a clear upward trend in the oil market.


On Thursday, OPEC+ published a new schedule that requires seven member countries to implement additional production cuts to compensate for their repeated non-compliance with previously agreed levels. The compensatory cuts will significantly exceed the monthly production increases the group plans to introduce starting next month. The plan represents monthly cuts between 199,000 and 435,000 barrels per day; see attached table. The compensatory cuts extend until June 2026.



*Note: figures in thousands of barrels per day


Amid OPEC+ negotiations, Kazakhstan dismissed its Energy Minister. The official is the scapegoat for tensions created by attempts to force OPEC+ policies on the major oil companies operating in the country. Kazakhstan has been producing at a record level and well above the quota agreed in OPEC+, as Chevron increased production in Kazakhstan's largest oil field, Tengiz. OPEC data from last week showed that Kazakhstan produced 1.767 million barrels per day of crude in February, compared to 1.570 million barrels per day in January. Kazakhstan's quota in OPEC+ is 1.468 MBPD.


In China, the government has structured an official subsidy program. Beijing has presented a $41 billion government subsidy program to incentivize consumers to replace their old consumer goods with new ones, thus boosting domestic sales in the face of threats to its export market. Chinese industrial production increased 5.9% year-on-year between January and February, exceeding consensus expectations. However, the rebound in the manufacturing industry so far in 2025 could also be due to anticipation of shipments to the U.S. before the new Trump administration tariffs take effect.


Chinese refineries have maintained high processing rates, partially draining inventories, higher than crude imports. China refined 14.74 million barrels per day during the first two months of 2025. This is a 2% year-on-year increase, primarily due to the entry into operation of new refining capacity in Yulong, approximately four hundred thousand barrels per day.


In India, crude oil import dependence is on track to reach a record level in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2025, as Indian fuel demand continues to grow while domestic crude production remains stagnant. During fiscal year 2024/25, crude imports will reach a historic maximum. During that period, India surpassed China as the world's most significant oil demand driver. Indian buyers have chartered more non-sanctioned tankers to deliver crude to India, as the price of Russia's flagship crude, Urals, has fallen below the $60/BBL limit established by G7 sanctions, allowing the use of tankers involving Western companies.

On the supply side, some unscheduled production interruptions in different countries also supported the oil market.


• Two pipelines in northeastern Colombia, Bicentenario and Caño Limón-Coveñas were forced to suspend pumping after being attacked with explosives, said Cenit, the liquid hydrocarbons transport company, on Thursday. Colombian military forces blamed the National Liberation Army (ELN) for attacks on this subsidiary of the state-owned oil company Ecopetrol (ECO.CN). The Bicentenario, with an extension of 230 kilometers, can transport an average of 150,000 barrels per day of crude. Meanwhile, the Caño Limón, which extends 773 kilometers, can transport up to 210,000 barrels daily.

• Nigeria's Trans-Niger pipeline, a significant oil artery that transports crude from onshore oil fields to the Bonny export terminal, was closed after an explosion caused a fire, said the country's police on Tuesday. Some attribute this to maintenance failures.

• In Ecuador, the rupture of the SOTE pipeline due to a landslide, which caused contamination in several rivers, kept pumping suspended for 6 days and forced the state-owned company to declare force majeure on shipments at Esmeraldas port.

 

Finally, and in line with our comments about BP last week, Equinor announced a change in its energy transition plan while striving to fulfill its promises to invest more in renewable energy and low-carbon technologies. The company speaks of practical difficulties and a change in political priorities. In 2021, the Norwegian oil and gas state-owned company presented short and medium-term measures aimed at achieving net zero emissions, including those derived from using its products, by 2050. But in February of this year, it abandoned its commitment to dedicating more than 50% of its capital investment to renewable energies and low-carbon solutions by 2030. Despite the changes, Equinor remains committed to its 2050 goals but is modifying its short-term targets.


"The energy transition has begun, but high-value growth opportunities are more limited than we had anticipated," said Equinor's CEO Anders Opedal on Thursday. Opedal blamed the increase in costs, challenges in the supply chain, delays by authorities in establishing the necessary framework conditions, and a change in government priorities for the change in strategy.


GEOPOLITICS

Russia and Ukraine plan separate meetings with the U.S. to advance negotiations for an elusive truce. President Trump continues to push for a partial ceasefire, although there is still no consensus on the terms of the agreement. In a phone call, Trump agreed with Putin to stop attacks on the energy infrastructure of both countries for thirty days, with Zelensky's agreement. But both Kyiv and the Kremlin accused each other of several attacks and, therefore, of breaching that promise. Given the risk of a fragile ceasefire, military leaders from several countries met in London on Thursday to discuss the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in Ukraine if a truce is achieved.


While these negotiations take place, the confrontations do not cease. Ukraine attacked the Russian Engels air base this week with drones, where they destroyed an undetermined number of Kh-101 missiles. Russia declared a state of emergency in the area housing the strategic Tupolev Tu-160 bombers with nuclear capability. For its part, the Kremlin intensified its offensive by launching drones against Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, and Kropyvnytskyi.


For some, Vladimir Putin's maximalist demands in his call with Donald Trump indicate that the Kremlin does not desire peace. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had previously observed that Ukraine's agreement on a ceasefire left the responsibility in Russia's hands. "If they refuse, we will know the impediment to peace here." Putin offered to stop attacks on energy infrastructure if Kyiv did the same while declaring that peace would require the total cessation of foreign military aid and intelligence supply to Ukraine. The impediment to a cessation of actions seems obvious, but the Trump administration appears to have little patience for details.


Ukraine will be present in the talks in Saudi Arabia while the United States negotiates with Russia next week in Riyadh. However, the possibility of a tripartite negotiation is still being considered. Kyiv seeks to capture the U.S. president's attention with its strategic mineral reserves and avoid a new distancing, especially after its recent interest in taking control of nuclear plants. However, Russia seems to have an advantage in its dialogues with the United States, encouraged by the U.S. conservative sector, which believes that yielding to Putin's demands could distance him from China.


The expected U.S. security guarantee to Europe has not materialized. If Washington decides to suspend military and intelligence aid to Ukraine again, the consequences for Kyiv would be unpredictable. However, the United States cannot force Ukraine to accept an unconditional ceasefire nor compel Europe to abandon its support for Kyiv. European leaders have understood that while they cannot control Trump's decisions, they can influence them and define their strategy. This is reflected not only in recent discussions about the possible creation of a European "reassurance force" in case of a ceasefire but also in the growing perception that Europe must prepare for a future without depending on U.S. security guarantees.


Germany's eliminating the debt brake to boost military spending is just the beginning of an uncertain path. The Russian threat is much more significant for some countries than for others. Opinions and national priorities in the old continent vary considerably. Leaders differ on whether to prioritize regional or transatlantic strengthening. These questions are sharpening during ongoing negotiations, and the results will shape the lives of future generations, not only in Ukraine but throughout Europe.


Israel resumed the war in Gaza with a surprise bombing on Tuesday morning, ending the fragile ceasefire and warning of an even greater escalation if Hamas does not release the remaining hostages and abandon the territory. By Friday, Israeli forces had advanced deeper into the Gaza Strip, while the country's leaders reaffirmed their intention to capture more territory until the hostages are released. Donald Trump has expressed his full support for the renewed offensive.


Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's coalition is now stronger than ever, and the number of hostages in Gaza has significantly decreased since Hamas initiated the war with its October 7, 2023 attack. This gives the Israeli army greater freedom of action, suggesting that the next conflict phase could be even more intense. "If all Israeli hostages are not released and Hamas is not expelled from Gaza, Israel will act with an intensity never seen before," warned Defense Minister Israel Katz on Wednesday.


In parallel, the Houthi rebels have resumed their attacks against Israel despite recent U.S. bombings of their strongholds in Yemen. Over the years, the Houthis have demonstrated the ability to resist military offensives, first from Saudi Arabia in 2014 and subsequently from the navies of the United Kingdom, U.S., and Israel.


PRICE DYNAMICS

Despite the geopolitical risks in the Middle East and the Russia/Ukraine conflict continuing without a solution, the oil market appears more sensitive to the activities described under "fundamentals." As such, prices gained more than 2% compared to the previous week. Thus, at market close on Friday, March 14, 2025, the Brent and WTI benchmark crude oils were trading at $72.16/bbl and $68.28/bbl, respectively.

 

VENEZUELA


THE SANCTIONS DAISY: HE LOVES ME, HE LOVES ME NOT!


Following a meeting between President Trump and top executives of major oil companies, including Michael Wirth, Chevron's CEO, lobbying has intensified from the American oil company and the regime in favor of maintaining the oil license regime. It is speculated that the relationship between Jorge Rodríguez and Richard Grenell, and Grenell's differences with Marco Rubio, could be an opportunity that the regime might exploit, as it successfully did with the Biden administration. The Venezuelan regime seeks to reverse the decision to replace License 41 with License 41A, instructing the dismantling of Chevron's operations in Venezuela before April 3, likely extendable to other licenses.


According to press reports and other media, the Trump administration is reviewing its decision regarding Venezuelan oil to either issue a new license that somehow restores oil flow or extend the operation dismantling period by an additional month. Other sources close to Secretary of State Marco Rubio indicate that he would not agree to reverse or change the decision, as this would only continue to assist a regime that has broken all its promises and keeps the people in a state of defenselessness while cooperating with international drug trafficking. In summary, Venezuela continues to confront the original dichotomy: licenses or no licenses. We will have to wait for the next few days to confirm the actual course of the Venezuelan oil business.


In any case, Chevron and the regime seem to be preparing for any eventuality. Enough tankers with diluent are heading to Venezuela to raise the production of the mixed enterprises operated by Chevron for at least one more month. At the same time, a significant number of VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) are observed that could load the entire national export to the Far East.


Meanwhile, the Venezuelan regime has been playing a distraction game with a new acceptance of repatriated flights from the U.S. In the interim, the Trump administration has sent 238 Venezuelans, supposedly from the Tren de Aragua gang to El Salvador under an agreement with President Bukele. The regime's angry protests did not wait, describing the delivery of 238 prisoners to El Salvador's prison authorities as a "violation of due process and mistreatment of compatriots." Beyond the fact that defending citizens is a state duty, this is a tremendous irony. The Venezuelan regime maintains hundreds of political prisoners without judicial process and has been harassing six high-ranking members of María Corina Machado's group in the Argentine and Brazilian embassies, denying them safe conduct for a year.


The economy continues to suffer from the same problems observed after the elections but with increasing intensity. Chronic foreign exchange scarcity, inorganic monetary financing, reduced public spending levels, and severe banking restrictions in the form of excessive legal reserves threaten to become structural. Despite all these measures, the BCV has been forced to allow a "controlled" devaluation of the official Bs./$ exchange rate. Market supply limitations have widened the gap between the parallel and official rates, which at the end of the week reached 29%. This situation fuels inflation, not published by the BCV, but rising vertiginously.


On the political side, the electoral farce continues. There was low attendance in the PSUV's internal process to choose candidates, although they speak of more than 5 million. The opposition co-opted by the regime continues campaigning to convince people to participate, and sources close to the CNE indicate that another postponement of the elections is imminent.


At the time of closing this article, President Trump published on his social network that his administration would impose a "secondary tariff" on Venezuela. That is, a 25% tariff would be imposed on any imports to the U.S. that come from any country that buys oil or gas from Venezuela, effective April 2, 2025. This decision, if implemented, is an explicit blockade of the national petroleum industry and can be seen as an unintended consequence of Chevron's argument that its exit from Venezuela would clear the way for Russia and China. In any case, this new sanction will harm the entire nation, and it is unclear whether it is an isolated decision or just a gambit in a broader political game.


Concurrently, OFAC issued License 41B, extending Chevron's "wind down" period until May 27, 2025, including exporting crude only to the U.S. This decision was not entirely unexpected but in dissonance with the "blockade" announced earlier by the American president. America First?


Petroleum Operations

All petroleum activity is pending the development of the license saga, although so far, this has not shown much effect on upstream and refining activities.


Crude production during the last week averaged eight hundred seventy-eight thousand barrels per day (mbd), geographically distributed as follows: 


• West:                         226 (Chevron 106) 

• East:                          128 

• Orinoco Belt:             524 (Chevron 121) 

• TOTAL:                     878 (Chevron 227)


National refineries processed 216 Mbpd of crude and intermediate products, with a gasoline yield of 78 Mbpd and 77 Mbpd of diesel. The average sale price of barrels marketed under OFAC licenses, net of debt payment, was $50.1/bbl, and the weighted average of all exports was $33.4/bbl. To date, no activity indicating cessation of operations by licensed companies has been observed. Some 7.3 MMBBLS have been sent under licensed exports during the month. As mentioned earlier, options that could materialize in the coming days are being handled flexibly.

 

VENEZUELA, IRAN, RUSSIA, USA: A DANGEROUS "COCKTAIL"

El Taladro Azul    Published  Originally in Spanish in    LA GRAN ALDEA M. Juan Szabo   and Luis A. Pacheco     The Trump presidency has bee...