PEACE IN UKRAINE. MIRAGE OR REALITY?

 El Taladro Azul

M. Juan Szabo [1] y Luis A. Pacheco [2]

Published  Originally in Spanish in  LA GRAN ALDEA

Photo: Shell's main office, Lagunillas, Venezuela, 1970's. Author: unknown

The news of an upcoming meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin, in principle to seek a way out of the already lengthy conflict between Russia and Ukraine, has become the main news for markets. Analysts speculate about the potential agreements they could reach: from a comprehensive agreement to a temporary ceasefire agreement. This new uncertainty kept the market with higher than usual volatility, but around already depressed price levels. The market does not entirely rule out some progress toward peace, but they are also concerned about the consequences if an agreement acceptable to Europeans or Ukraine is not reached.

Late Friday, President Trump confirmed that he will meet with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on August 15 in Alaska. Ukrainian President Zelensky, who has not been invited to the summit where his country's future will be discussed, preemptively announced that he will not cede land to the invader.

OPEC+'s announcement that it would continue dismantling its production cuts and bring more barrels to market kept prices in a moderately bearish trend for most of the week. This occurred in an environment determined by increasing restrictions on sanctioned crude purchases by China and India, efforts to limit the use of the so-called dark fleet that transports Russian oil, and North American commercial inventory figures that reflected a new reduction.

FUNDAMENTALS

Oil market reactions have not entirely followed market fundamentals; on the contrary, the perception of insecurity regarding geopolitical components and their potential effect on demand has dominated movements. Based on available statistics, the fundamentals continue to show that the market is slightly undersupplied despite advances in supply observed within and outside OPEC+, which would push prices upward under other circumstances.

OPEC+ Situation

Preliminary indications show an increase in supply from the 8 OPEC+ countries reversing production cuts. Since the beginning of the opening announced by the group, the total increase reaches about eight hundred thousand barrels per day (800 Mbpd) for the first days of August, well below the 1.8 million barrels per day OPEC+ announcements stated for this date. As we have postulated in other articles, production nominally subject to opening is not readily available and requires potential generation activity to restore its "closed" potential condition. We continue to maintain that production volumes, according to OPEC+ announcements (2.2 MMbpd), will not reach the market in their entirety this year. Nigeria is producing at its highest levels in months. Iraq, Russia, and Kazakhstan have not reached the announced opening volumes.

• Iraq announced the imminent operation of the pipeline connecting Kurdish region production to the Ceyhan export port in Turkey; however, Kurdish production is incapacitated by recent military attacks on its infrastructure.
• Russia produces at the top of its potential, and its capacity to place its exports is hindered by sanctions and measures taken to diminish the effectiveness of the "shadow fleet" responsible for transporting Russian crude to India and China. The average Russian maritime exports have decreased from 3.2 million barrels per day in 2024 to 2.1 million barrels per day in 2025.
• Kazakhstan can only increase its production to the extent that its new fields are developed by foreign operators. Thus, the same reasons that led it to exceed its quotas prevent compliance with the new guidelines.
• 
  

United States and Other Producers

The U.S. continues to play a stabilizing role by maintaining its production at around 13.2 million barrels per day, with a slight declining trend due to most American oil companies' policy to maintain or reduce their activity levels. This week, the Baker Hughes report reveals a reduction of only one unit in the active rig list, but a more detailed inspection reveals that this figure is the net result of a decrease of 4 units in the most attractive oil basins, offset by drilling activity in areas in response to local associated gas needs.

The weekly report from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) revealed a three-million-barrel drop in North American commercial crude inventories despite a reduction in crude exports.

New Supplies: Guyana and Brazil

As we have mentioned, other supply additions come from Guyana and Brazil. Indeed, ExxonMobil, the operator of the Stabroek block, has put online the One Guyana FPSO (floating production and storage unit) with 250,000 bbl/d capacity, four months ahead of schedule. Located in the Yellowtail field, this unit is the project's fourth FPSO, raising total production capacity above 900,000 barrels daily.

With more than 11 billion barrels of oil equivalent in recoverable resources identified to date, the ExxonMobil-led consortium plans to implement four additional FPSOs by 2030, which would raise total production capacity to 1.7 million barrels per day: the Errea Wittu, in the Uaru field in 2026; the Jaguar, in the Whiptail field in 2027; and an unnamed FPSO in the Hammerhead field in 2029. A large-scale FPSO is also planned to address massive amounts of natural gas in the Longtail field, which will be the country's first gas project.

The scale of the project and upcoming plans are exactly why Chevron acquired Hess Corporation - CNOOC International (Chinese state-owned) is the third partner in the block. Stabroek, already one of Latin America's largest oil producers, is on track to rival Petrobras's giant pre-salt fields in Brazil and is a key source of new barrels for the global oil market.

Global Demand

India and China continue to be the engines of demand growth. China, to a lesser degree, but India will reach a demand of 6.2 MMBPD by early 2026, an increase of three hundred thousand barrels per day in 6 months.

Mexico and Pemex

Mexico is also trying to recover its state oil company, Pemex, from the financial and operational debacle it is experiencing. The president of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, unveiled a strategic plan for Pemex to achieve economic self-sufficiency and return to the path of oil and gas production growth.

The plan includes achieving financial self-sufficiency by 2027, increasing oil production, and reducing the company's debt by approximately one hundred billion dollars, starting with a reduction of thirteen billion by the end of this year. To achieve this, the government will continue providing financial support to Pemex until at least 2027.

The proposed strategy also contemplates managing significant liabilities with contractors and suppliers. The organization plans to increase production through reactivation of existing wells, development of new resources such as the offshore Zama and Trión deposits, and expanding the use of hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") for unconventional deposit exploitation, which represents a relevant change in the current government's policy.

Initiatives in refining, petrochemicals, and distribution areas will complement these actions. However, the comprehensive plan is anticipated to require time to address the company's structural problems, so substantial production increases are not expected in the short term.

Monetary Policy

In the U.S., banking and government authorities anticipate that the Federal Reserve (FED) will announce at its next meeting an interest rate cut of at least a quarter percentage point (0.25%) as the beginning of several cuts during the rest of the year, in response to retroactive adjustments regarding employment figures and unemployment levels. The Bank of England and European Central Bank have reduced rates to stimulate European industry.

GEOPOLITICS

Numerous decisions have been made in the global geopolitical sphere. The most relevant could result from the meeting between President Trump and President Putin. The market debates between various possibilities, from the trivial, that is, that they agree on nothing and it will only be a forum for presenting each party's demands, to an unlikely comprehensive agreement that ends the war and multiple sanctions. In any case, no agreement will be able to resolve in the short term the differences generated between the two parties with this invasion or heal the scars from the destruction of lives.

Tensions between the U.S. and Russia

Faced with the serious American threat to impose new tariffs on Russia in the absence of progress toward a cessation of hostilities, oil prices showed some upward trend. The market considered that these tariffs and other sanctions and pressures could significantly impact Russian exports.

President Putin decided not to risk reaching that crossroads and proposed a face-to-face meeting with President Trump to prevent him from rushing to decide. This last-minute decision has been a widely used negotiation tactic by the Russian leader: gain time without offering any commitment. Since the beginning of this conflict, Putin's strategy has been to demand and not yield.

The meeting between the U.S. and Russia will take place in Alaska on August 15, according to an announcement by President Trump, which Russian sources have not confirmed. Preemptively, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has emphasized that he will not make territorial concessions to the invader and that Ukraine must participate in any peace solution, and showed willingness to collaborate with his partners to achieve "real" and "lasting" peace. Zelensky's comment is interpreted as a response to Trump's indication that Ukraine might have to cede territory to end the war.

Ongoing Conflict

Meanwhile, on the battlefield, a Russian drone attack in the Odesa region, southern Ukraine, damaged an oil depot owned by the Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR. On the Ukrainian side, a drone attack caused a fire at the Afipsky oil refinery in Russia's Krasnodar region. The fire was controlled on Thursday, but the refinery suffered considerable damage. The Russian Defense Ministry said anti-aircraft defense systems shot down nine Ukrainian drones over the region during the night of August 7.

Middle East

In the Middle East, Israel's security cabinet approved a plan to take control of Gaza City, a measure that extends military operations in the devastated Gaza Strip territory. The news generated intense criticism inside and outside Israel because it makes it more difficult to find a resolution to a war that has already lasted almost two years. Far-right allies in the Israeli prime minister's coalition have been pushing for a complete takeover of Gaza as part of their promise to eradicate Hamas militants. However, the army has warned that this could endanger the lives of remaining hostages in Palestinian militants' hands.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu responded to international criticism, stating that Israel's objective is not to take control of Gaza, but to liberate it from Hamas and allow a peaceful government to be established there.

Trade Tensions

On the other hand, American trade negotiations around tariff imposition have progressed, achieving agreements with several countries. However, tariff imposition for geopolitical reasons has not had the same effectiveness: tariffs on Brazil for alleged harassment of former President Bolsonaro and tariffs imposed on India for purchasing Russian crude have received resounding rejection from Brasilia and New Delhi.

The U.S. and China face an August 12 deadline to extend their tariff pause, while Trump intensifies threats of higher tariffs, pressing for Russian oil purchases. China defended its Russian oil purchases, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry said Friday that it is "legitimate and legal for China to carry out normal economic, commercial and energy cooperation with all countries in the world, including Russia."

The complexity of geopolitical events being handled in parallel, and most marked by uncertainties, makes markets, including oil, remain disoriented. The importance of geopolitics in the oil market has shifted from the Middle East to tensions between major powers.

PRICE DYNAMICS

Crude oil prices fell to a five-week low during Friday's session, responding to reports that Trump was working on a peace deal in the Ukraine war. Brent crude has been approaching $66/BBL, as reducing the risk of additional sanctions on Russia, if these do not materialize, would mitigate the risk premium that the market currently factors in.

However, a possible failure in negotiations could provoke the opposite effect. On another note, the difficulty in estimating how much crude OPEC+ can actually incorporate of the 2.2 million barrels per day announced has generated uncertainty regarding the oil market's direction.

Thus, the quotation of benchmark crudes Brent and WTI, at market close on Friday, August 8, stood at $66.59/BBL and $63.88/BBL respectively, representing a weekly loss of 4%, in Brent crude terms, compared to the previous week's close.

VENEZUELA

Chevron, the Arrival of the "Cavalry"

In recent days, attention in the Venezuelan audience has been focusing on verifying that Chevron's return to Venezuelan oil fields was being fulfilled and trying to determine when, how, and how much benefit would be obtained by PDVSA and the government in this new round of oil sanctions mitigation. Like in old western movies, the last-minute arrival of the cavalry, in this case the American oil company, is expected to save the day.

Contradictions in U.S. Policy

What no one expected was the surprising appearance of U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi, announcing that the U.S. had increased the bounty for the capture of Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela's acting president, to $50 million. In the same video, Bondi stated that the Venezuelan regime has become a direct threat to U.S. national security.

This development, in the increasingly confusing American script regarding Venezuela is an unprecedented measure. Never before had the U.S. government offered such a sum for a sitting head of state. It even exceeds the reward offered for Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden. In other words, in the White House's eyes, Nicolás Maduro is no longer just a political figure, but a priority judicial target for U.S. justice. A situation that appears incongruent with granting a license to authorize Chevron's operations in Venezuela.

Some analysts have tried to validate the existence of both policies by claiming that Nicolás Maduro has to go, but that private oil company activity allows maintaining the industry for the benefit of the Venezuelan people, without financing the Venezuelan regime, while allowing private companies to recover the money PDVSA owes them. A situation that no one has been able to explain how it would work.

Military Threats in the Region

Additionally, according to The New York Times, although not confirmed by the White House, President Trump secretly signed a directive ordering the Pentagon to begin planning the use of military force against certain Latin American drug cartels that the Administration has declared terrorist organizations. Mexico's president reacted angrily to this not-so-veiled threat of intervention, while the Venezuelan foreign ministry called the announcement about Nicolás Maduro a "smoke screen." Colombia's president, Gustavo Petro, also joined the criticism. The White House announcements seem derailed if we also factor in Trump's distancing from Lula.

Chevron Operations

Returning to the economic topic, three tanker ships Chevron had chartered for transporting crude from Venezuela to Gulf of America refineries are back. One is already anchored in Aruba waters, and the other two are approaching this same island. This is where tankers are filled with partial loads from the Bajo Grande terminal, in Lake Maracaibo. These tankers are waiting for the crude they will take to the U.S. to be ready for loading, presumably in the second half of August.

Economic Situation

Meanwhile, the economy continues its recessionary trend, despite Nicolás Maduro announcing that during the first half of the year the Venezuelan economy had grown 7.2%, a figure very different from independent estimates that place first-quarter growth at barely 2.1%, and a contraction in the second quarter.

In stark contrast to his optimism about growth, the regime has again decreed an economic emergency in Venezuela to “ protect the people" from the impact that Donald Trump's announced tariff decisions and the hardening of international sanctions on the country will have on national finances. This new decree is more likely to seek to extend the existing emergency powers, which could not be extended without a new decree.

Currency Crisis

Lower international oil prices and the hefty discounts required to place crude in the Far East have reduced foreign currency availability, accelerating devaluation and increasing inflation. As we indicated last week, this economic collapse was mainly due to the cancellation of OFAC licenses in May. The third quarter will pass with little difference from the second quarter, given that income from the new license granted to Chevron will not be received until late September and in amounts smaller than that obtained with license 41.

So the bolívar's devaluation will continue. The official exchange rate has already surpassed 130 Bs./$, with restricted amounts for importers, settled mainly in USDT; the rest of the dollar demand had to seek alternative markets with transactions above 170 Bs./$. Meanwhile, economic drivers are trying to extend the application of measures until income related to crude sold to Chevron begins to be seen, in a kind of Christmas advance.

OIL OPERATIONS

Chevron Reactivation

Chevron has already begun to resume its operational positions and contacts with oil contractors, but the process takes some time despite the company not having completely departed from its activities. During the week, much movement was observed at the PetroPiar upgrading plant in eastern Venezuela.

National Production

Crude production during the last week averaged eight hundred forty-two thousand barrels per day (842 Mbpd), distributed geographically as follows:

Area	Mbpd
West	210
East	120
Orinoco Belt	512
TOTAL	842

Refining

National refineries processed 215 Mbpd of crude and intermediate products, with a yield in gasoline terms of 70 Mbpd and 75 Mbpd of diesel.

Petrochemical Sector

In the petrochemical sector, methanol plants operate at 85% of their capacity. Fertinitro maintains one ammonia/urea train running and the other is in startup operations, all adjusted to the natural gas availability the complex receives. The Superoctanos plant will be operated for a limited period until the available butanes in the complex are consumed.

Exports

This week, Crude exports were limited to two shipments (3.9 MMbbls) destined for the Far East. The weighted price of exported crude is at $32.16/bbl.

¹ International Analyst

² Nonresident Fellow Baker Institute 

ANOTHER FRIDAY OF RECKONING

El Taladro Azul

M. Juan Szabo [1] y Luis A. Pacheco [2]

Published  Originally in Spanish in  LA GRAN ALDEA

During the last week, what appears to be a recurring pattern in oil market behavior was observed again. Despite the presence of factors typically considered bearish—such as the unexpected increase in U.S. crude inventories, the imposition of new tariffs and uncertainty about existing ones, the Federal Reserve's (FED) decision to maintain interest rates, Chevron's return to Venezuela with access to the U.S. market, and the U.S. employment slowdown—barrel prices showed a slightly bullish trend until the end of the week.

As has occurred in recent weeks, the market corrected on Friday, August 1st. The news that OPEC+ was evaluating the possibility of concluding the remaining voluntary cuts (548 Mbpd) in September of this year functioned as a catalyst, reversing the effect of the bearish news and causing an approximate $2/bbl drop in oil prices.

News in the geopolitical sphere also added uncertainty to the market, starting with the exchange of threats between the U.S. and Russia. On Friday, Trump announced that he was ordering the deployment of two nuclear submarines in regions near Russia, in response to the threats from former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev, the current vice-president of Russia's Security Council. On the other hand, Indian state refineries limit purchases of Russian crude to avoid sanctions from the U.S. government.

FUNDAMENTALS

Economic Situation in the United States

The Trump administration is encountering obstacles in developing its government plan. The employment report for July showed that only 73,000 jobs were created and that 258,000 fewer jobs were created in May and June than previously reported. The report suggested that the economy has weakened during Trump's mandate, a pattern consistent with economic growth deceleration during the first half of the year and an increase in inflation in June, which seemed to reflect price pressure generated by tariffs. The unemployment rate rose slightly to 4.2%, still low, from 4.1%.

President Trump's reaction was immediate. "In my opinion, today's job numbers were rigged to make Republicans, and me, look bad... we need accurate employment figures," Trump wrote and considered that the head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Erika McEntarfer, manipulated the statistics for political reasons and ordered her removal from the position, generating protests from the Democratic party and alarm voices about the reliability of official figures, past and future. In any case, the statistics indicate a weakening of the North American economy, in an environment where the FED again chose to maintain interest rates, focusing only on inflationary expectations; another front where Trump's expectations have not been met, despite his continued pressure on Jerome Powell.

U.S. Oil Activity

Oil activity in the U.S., the world's largest crude producer, continues without relevant changes, with production declining asymptotically toward 13 MMbpd, evidence, on one hand, of the robustness of its production base and also the complexity of generating significant growth. Production potential generation activity is directed toward the natural gas sector in response to expectations of growing sales of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the European Union. Baker Hughes indicates this, showing a reduction (-2) in active rigs; the net number corresponds to an increase of 3 rigs dedicated to gas and a decrease of 5 units in oil activity.

The Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its weekly report, revealed a surprising increase of 7.7 MMbbls in commercial crude inventories, of which 1.2 MMbpd corresponds to higher crude imports; it also reports a reduction of 2.1 MMbbls in gasoline inventories.

Tariffs and International Trade

To this complex panorama, we must add the multiple negotiations and imposition of tariffs that will affect the global economy. Thursday night, Trump ordered new tariffs for 66 countries, effective August 7th. If maintained, this decision's effect will be seen over time.

OPEC+ Situation

Since April of this year, OPEC+ has been dismantling the production cuts that had contributed to balancing the market in critical moments. It announced the cumulative opening of 1.8 million barrels per day by the end of August. Last Sunday's meeting, the cartel agreed to open the remaining production from the 2.2 million barrels per day that it had taken out of the market (547 Mbpd) post-pandemic.

The opening process has not been free of inconveniences. Only in the second month of the process (May) was an increase evident. Since then, some countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, and Kazakhstan—have shown they can contribute additional volumes, but not in the programmed quantities. As we have analyzed in previous works, idle production potential had not been entirely preserved due to a lack of investment; on the contrary, it would have been used to compensate for part of the natural decline. Consequently, drilling activity is required to comply with what was announced.

We observe in Baker Hughes reports that Middle Eastern countries would have added rigs in May and June; the trend did not continue in July. Much of the lag has to do with Russian limitations, the third-largest producing country, to control its decline, and with the rivalry of Iraq's central government with its Kurdish population in the north of the country.

Ecuador

In the southern hemisphere, Petroecuador ordered on Wednesday night, July 30th, that the force majeure declaration issued 27 days ago as a consequence of the damage caused to transport infrastructure by the reactivation of regressive erosion of the Coca River, in the Napo area, be lifted. With this decision, the company resumes its contractual commitments and officially resumes Oriente and Napo crude exports starting August 1st. Ecuador's oil production recorded its biggest operational collapse in over two decades in July. On July 22nd, extraction fell to a historic minimum of just 31,831 barrels per day, according to Ecuador's Central Bank (BCE) data. Now comes a process of starting up the production fields and restarting pumping through both trans-Andean pipelines.

Malaysia and Sanctioned Crude Trade

An announcement by Malaysian authorities could affect the transport and arrival in China of sanctioned crude. Malaysia introduced new regulations to avoid illegal oil transfers in its territorial waters. As is widely known, this country's territorial waters are the preferred site for "dark" fleets from Russia, Iran, and Venezuela to make STS (ship-to-ship) transfers, before their "legitimized" access to China.

Global Production Perspectives

The oil market's concern regarding the materialization of crude oversupply before the end of the year is aggravated by predictions of production increases in countries outside the OPEC+ circle. News sources repeatedly speak of increases in the U.S., Canada, Brazil, Guyana, and Argentina, assigning them a rise between six hundred thousand barrels per day and one million barrels per day in 2025. However, recent evidence from these countries' authorities points to a combined increase of five hundred thousand barrels per day by the end of the year.

So the real production increase from Non-OPEC+ countries, combined with the lag in production opening by the eight countries involved in dismantling OPEC+ cuts, and an uncompensated decline in the rest of the producers, reduces or eliminates the possibility of overproduction. On the contrary, the supply/demand balance depends on demand and its capacity to grow in an environment plagued by recession prophecies.

GEOPOLITICS

Current geopolitics continues to be permeated by intense rivalry between powers like the United States, China, and Russia. These powers compete for preeminence in technology, trade, strategic resources, and control over key geographical regions, which in some instances are war scenarios. This struggle between powers has fragmented traditional alliances, such as the Russian relationship with Europe for gas supply, reconfigured trade routes, and elevated the risk of indirect confrontations. At the same time, the world polarizes between blocks seeking to impose their political and economic models.

Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Under this generalized description falls the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Putin's stubbornness in not negotiating even a ceasefire, much less conditions to end this prolonged war that has decimated his army and Ukraine's and has disrupted his economy, has led the European Union not only to rearm but also to impose additional trade sanctions on Russia and has made President Trump modify his approach to that conflict. In addition to EU sanctions, Trump threatens to impose sanctions on Russia in the coming days if there are no tangible results toward a cessation of hostilities. The U.S. president has also pressured India and China to stop buying Russian crude.

India and Russian Sanctions

India understood that cheap Russian crude did not merit a conflict with the U.S., so India's state refineries stopped buying Russian oil last week. India, the world's third-largest oil importer, is the largest buyer of Russian crude transported by sea. The four state refineries, representing 60% of Russian crude purchases, have begun turning to spot markets to replace the Russian supply of around eight hundred thousand barrels daily. The sanctions and pressures resulted in less placement of Russian crude in the market, further reducing Russian revenues.

U.S.-Russia Tensions

Relations between Russia and the U.S. deteriorated even further following statements by former Russian president Dimitri Medvedev, which U.S. diplomacy considered provocative and senseless. In response to Medvedev's comments, President Trump ordered two nuclear submarines to "position themselves in appropriate regions", the current vice president of Russia's Security Council. Trump said he acted "just in case these senseless and incendiary statements were something more than that. Words are very important and can often have unforeseen consequences; I hope this is not one of those cases."

Middle East Conflict

In the Middle East conflict, more countries are joining criticism of Israel's campaign in Gaza and its effects on the civilian population, while the fate of those kidnapped by Hamas seems to have taken a back seat. Great Britain appears to have joined the position of France's president, Emmanuel Macron. After a cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Starmer announced that he would recognize the Palestinian state "unless the Israeli government takes substantive measures to end the terrible situation in Gaza, reaches a ceasefire, makes clear there will be no annexation in the West Bank, and commits to a long-term peace process that offers a two-state solution." The conditions on the table for a cessation of conflict also include some that Hamas would have to fulfill, and that doesn’t look easy to achieve for both Israel and Hamas.

A surprising change in the region was the request from a group of Arab nations demanding that Hamas lay down arms and hand over control of Gaza. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt asked that the terrorist group disarm and dissolve. It is the first time these countries condemn Hamas and demand that it not participate in Palestine's future. Finally, the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Iran is maintained, and Turkish authorities report that a precarious ceasefire has also been reached between Israel and Syria.

Since the Middle East conflict does not seem to influence oil production centers, geopolitics' effects on the market are focused on two areas related to the U.S.: economic sanctions, particularly on Russia, and tariff negotiations worldwide.

PRICE DYNAMICS

Prices showed resilience throughout the week, not reacting to news commonly capable of negatively affecting prices. Still, on Friday, when the possibility that OPEC+ would propitiate another production opening in September (as indeed occurred) was added to the accumulation of bearish news, the price base weakened, generating a "mass sell-off" in the market and a drop in crude prices, without weighing the real probabilities that this opening could be carried out in the stipulated timeframes.

Thus, the quotation of Brent and WTI marker crudes, at market close on Friday, August 1st, stood at $69.67/bbl and $67.33/bbl, respectively. Despite Friday's price collapse, the market closed with a weekly gain of 1.7% for Brent crude and 3.2% for WTI, respectively.

VENEZUELA

The God Janus and Politics

Maximum pressure and pragmatism are the two faces of U.S. policy toward Venezuela. Like the Roman god Janus, the White House policy looks backward at the Biden administration while seeking to design its own policy forward.

This week, it was confirmed that Chevron had obtained a specific license to continue operating in Venezuela through its joint ventures with PDVSA: a modified reissue (due to confidentiality) of General License 41 that the Biden administration granted in 2022. The confirmation came from Chevron's president and CEO, Mike Wirth, without giving details about the characteristics or limitations of the license, assuring that the flow of Venezuelan oil to the U.S. would soon resume.

Meanwhile, President Trump underlines the evils generated by the actions of Nicolás Maduro's administration, whom he has just designated as the leader of the Cartel of the Suns, officially declared as a terrorist organization. Moreover, Secretary of State Marco Rubio declares that Maduro is not Venezuela's legitimate president. Contradictory positions with the granting of a new license,  some would say, but evidence of the powerful interests at play. Since General Juan Vicente Gómez, Venezuela has never been subject to international oil interests, as it is today.

Venezuelan Economic Situation

The country is on the brink of an economic recession, a product of a lack of sufficient foreign currency income. This lack of foreign currency income forces continuous financing of the economy with inorganic money, feeding the devaluation of the national currency and catapulting inflation to excessively high levels. The license to Chevron, and probably others will follow, could seem like the prescribed medicine for all ills, not to mention the additional benefit of tacit recognition of Maduro and his administration.

Analysis of the New License (LNCh)

Although analyzing a license with unknown characteristics is challenging, it is helpful to speculate about it educatedly. For this, we have developed a scenario that we consider has sufficient coherence, connecting pieces of unofficial information leaked by some of the interested parties, statements by U.S. authorities, and characteristics of the extinct LG 41.

We will then compare the oil situation under LG 41's validity with the maximum pressure situation without licenses and with a scenario that intends to represent the situation under the new license, which we have called LNCh.

The LNCh scenario would authorize Chevron the de facto management (not necessarily legal) of procurement, investment, and production operations, on behalf of the Joint Ventures (JV). This time, the flow would differ from the situation under license 41, in that the JVs would deliver the royalty to the nation in kind (oil) and the remainder, approximately 70% ownership of what is produced, would be transferred by the JVs to Chevron; as before, Chevron would be allowed to take this crude to the U.S. market.

Chevron would retain an agreed amount from the crude's market value to amortize the debt that PDVSA still maintains with the multinational. From the remaining value, Chevron finances the operating cost (OPEX) and investments (CAPEX) of the JVs. To complete the agreed distribution between the Nation and Chevron, the company would pay the taxes the JV must pay and the profits, if any, corresponding to PDVSA's majority participation in the JV, delivering diluents and fuels equivalent to an agreed equivalent value.

This flow of oil, products, and money complies with the premise that is said to exist in the Trump administration, which is that there would be no cash transfer from Chevron to Maduro's administration. The licensed transactions we describe would comply with the letter we understand from the announcements, but violate the spirit of Venezuelan laws.

Scenario Comparison

Let's see then the comparison of the three cases (assuming Brent at $70/bbl):

[Chart showing comparison of three scenarios: Maximum Pressure, LG41, and LNCh, displaying various metrics like crude export to China, crude export to US, barter amounts, forex supply, and net income]

• The graph shows that for the LNCh case, crude exported to China is greater than in LG41 because of the volumes received by the Nation as royalty payment, which would no longer go to the U.S., but to the Far East.
• The volume handled as barter increases considerably in relation to LG41, due to the inclusion of equivalent amounts of tax and dividend payments—hence it appears as positive income.
• The foreign currency that Chevron supplies to the exchange market would be considerably reduced since it would only include the bolivar component of OPEX and CAPEX.
• Net income in the LNCh scenario would be 87% higher than the sanctioned case and only 13% less than in the LG41 case (assuming the same export).
• The graph does not show that debt recovery will be somewhat slower if the estimated concepts per barrel from license 41 are maintained. Remember that only 70% of crude produced by the JVs, with some diluent, would enter the U.S. market under this new license.

These conclusions must be taken as an approximation due to the nature and origin of the premises.

License Impact

In any event, the license conferred to Chevron, under this analysis, represents a temporary lifeline for the Venezuelan economy, which was shipwrecking in turbulent waters. However, it would only provide symptom relief, not the cure for the structural disease of the economy, or the oil industry in particular.

The policy of adaptation to sanctions, which has brought public spending to minimum levels, the official exchange rate to almost 126 Bs./$, and galloping inflation, can now be managed with the economic strategies used before April 2025.

Political Situation

On the political side, the municipal elections at the end of July were announced as a resounding victory for the ruling party, and they have already begun to consider the transition to the communal scheme. The ruling party says the electoral cycle is closed, and Maduro and Cabello call on the new opposition to begin new times. Meanwhile, Edmundo González and María Corina Machado indicated that the low voter turnout is another demonstration that the current political scheme lacks popular support and highlighted the qualification of the Cartel of the Suns as a terrorist organization.

OIL OPERATIONS

Transition to the New License

The transition to the new license will not be instantaneous, since only barrels produced from the entry into force of the new instrument are counted for the new licensing regime. Suppose we assume that the new license entered into force on July 20th, and based on the fact that the production capacity of the JVs has only declined slightly to date. In that case, between Bajo Grande and Jose, an inventory of less than 1.5 MMbbls of crude is available. Hence, Chevron's crude purchase and its transport to Gulf of America refineries (formerly Mexico) could begin in the second week of August: first from Bajo Grande, in Lake Maracaibo, due to the size of tankers used on that route, and then from Jose. The financial effect of the new license will not be felt until early September.

Crude Production

Crude production during the last week averaged eight hundred forty-five thousand barrels per day (845 Mbpd), geographically distributed as follows:

Area	Mbpd
West	211
East	120
Orinoco Belt	514
TOTAL	845

Refining

National refineries processed 212 Mbpd of crude and intermediate products, with a yield of 70 Mbpd for gasoline and 73 Mbpd for diesel.

Upgraders

The crude produced in the PetroPiar upgrader, Hamaca Blend, is used partially as diluent for belt crude, and the rest is sent to refining. This latter use will necessarily change under Chevron's new license. The PetroCedeño upgrader continues to obtain intermediate products that are used as feedstock in refining. The PetroRoraima (PetroZuata) and PetroMonagas upgraders remain non-operational.

Petrochemical Sector

There have been no changes in plant activity in the petrochemical sector at the José complex.

Exports

Crude exports in July averaged 575 Mbpd. All tankers were destined for China. 106 Mbpd of Boscán and 469 Mbpd of Merey 16 were the only segregations dispatched in July. 62 Mbpd of residual was exported to the Far East, and a smaller quantity to Cuba. The weighted price of exported crudes is estimated at $33.61/bbl.

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¹ International Analyst
² Nonresident Fellow Baker Institute

SURPRISE AS STRATEGY

    El Taladro Azul

M. Juan Szabo [1] y Luis A. Pacheco [2]

Published  Originally in Spanish in  LA GRAN ALDEA

That the world is controlled by the decisions and interests of great powers, military or economic, should not surprise anyone. What appears novel today is the volatility that seems to have settled in the corridors of the halls where those decisions are made. President Trump's tariff negotiations and his surprising changes of direction in matters of war diplomacy, sanctions, and oil licenses, and international negotiations in general, are a demonstration, perhaps the most important, of that volatility, and keep the markets—including oil—and world leaders, with few exceptions, in distress.

During the week, oil prices exhibited volatility in reaction to the announcement of a trade agreement between the United States and Japan and the potential impact of the possible return of Venezuelan oil to U.S. markets. Shortly before the market closed on Friday, the 25th, it became known that hopes for a trade agreement between the United States and Europe were fading, and prices fell by more than $1/bbl.

The geopolitical environment remained convulsed, mainly in Ukraine and the Middle East. Efforts to achieve ceasefires on both fronts have been fruitless. Intense pressures on Israel to suspend its campaign in Gaza and on Russia regarding Ukraine have also been ineffective. In general, the week's warlike activities did not have a material impact on risk perception.

On Sunday, at the last hour, it was announced that the United States and the European Union had reached a trade agreement, with tariffs of 15% on European exports to the U.S., and 0% on U.S. exports to the European Union. Both parties declared themselves satisfied with the agreement; we must wait for the oil market's reaction.

FUNDAMENTALS

Last week, global oil fundamentals encouraged the market to move upward, responding to inventory movements and OPEC+'s lag in opening new production capacity, which was caused by limitations in the available potential in some member countries. On the other hand, the incremental production projected for countries outside the OPEC+ sphere also shows delays, as we have warned when analyzing forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Indeed, the United States is not increasing its production; on the contrary, it is showing a discrete decline. The United States continued with its process of rig deactivation. Baker Hughes reports a net reduction of 2 units, but more detailed analysis indicates that the loss in potential generation capacity is broader since five rigs went out of service in the Permian and Eagle Ford basins.

Regarding Canada and Brazil, the increases achieved to date are lower than projections: they show month-to-month growth of 0.4% and 0.3%, respectively, compared to a projection of 1.2% incremental production for each in June.

In OPEC orbit countries, specifically in some Persian Gulf countries, additional rigs are being added to replace the idle production potential that natural decline erased, which some analysts still account for.

Meanwhile, Ecuador is experiencing one of the worst oil crises in history. The force majeure declaration due to rains, which persists, has reduced production and a lack of exports, is pressuring the State's financial plans, and is affecting the global supply and demand balance.

GEOPOLITICS

Amid the continued conflagration on battlefields, negotiation efforts to achieve ceasefires in Gaza, Syria, and Ukraine are intensifying; meetings in Doha, Washington, and Istanbul have taken place, but none have achieved their objective.

Syria

In Syria, there seems to be an agreement, in principle, between the provisional government presided over by Ahmed al-Charaa, the Sunni Bedouin militias, which seem to be confused with the Syrian army, and the Druze groups. The conflict was initiated by the Bedouin attack against the Druze population, which in turn led Israel to intervene in favor of the Druze. To date, there are more than 1,200 dead, of whom more than 200 correspond to summary executions.

Gaza

The situation in Gaza is what has attracted the most international attention, not because of the exchanges of fire between militant groups and Israel, but because of the communicational battle that has been generated around the humanitarian situation that the population displaced by the conflict is going through. Both sides blame each other for what some humanitarian organizations call famine. While news originating in Gaza says that the Israeli siege does not allow food or humanitarian aid to enter, Israel maintains that food is entering, but that it is either stolen by Hamas or not distributed due to a lack of United Nations (UN) personnel. Another factor that goes unnoticed, and that contributes to the shortage in the region, is Gaza's iron border with Egypt, through which they do not allow the passage of either refugees or aid.

The profound humanitarian crisis, which always results from armed conflicts, but which seems to surprise international agencies, has led Israel to lose part of the support gained after Hamas's bloody attack, and the Netanyahu government is now beginning to be perceived as the aggressor.

French President Emmanuel Macron declared that he will recognize Palestine at the next UN General Assembly, in another symptom of the change in the dynamics of the Gaza conflict. This is an attempt to create momentum for change and break with the passivity of the leading Western powers, in the face of what Macron calls the massive slaughter of Palestinians by Israel in Gaza. Macron's declaration significantly increases pressure on the United Kingdom, Germany, and other G7 powers to recognize the Palestinian state. Germany had already announced that it was not in their plans; their historical memory puts it in the rear guard against any pressure on Israel. In this new dynamic of the conflict, the relevance of the Israeli hostages that Hamas has held since its attack on Israel in 2023 seems to fade, despite their families' efforts.

The United States and Israel decided to step back from the Gaza Strip ceasefire negotiations, which were taking place in Doha, Qatar. Both governments blamed Hamas for the stagnation of the dialogues. Steve Witkoff, the special envoy for the Middle East, announced that he ordered his team's return to the United States: "We have decided to bring our team back from Doha for consultations following Hamas's latest response, which demonstrates their unwillingness to reach a ceasefire in Gaza."

Iran

In this highly convulsed region, Iran, weakened after U.S. and Israeli attacks, also faces domestic problems. There have been strong protests in favor of freedom of expression in several Iranian cities due to the repression of previous demonstrations. Citizens demand political reforms and respect for human rights.

Ukraine

On the Ukrainian-Russian front, amid failed efforts to negotiate a ceasefire, cross attacks between Ukraine and Russia, and intense military confrontations are reported at several hot points of the war front, more than 500 km long, mainly around the cities of Pokrovsk and Kindrativka. On the diplomatic front, Turkish President Erdoğan wants to raise the level of conversations. He said he would speak with Trump and Putin this week to see if an Istanbul leader meeting could discuss a ceasefire in Ukraine.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitri Peskov said that a summit between Putin and Zelensky could only occur as a final step to seal a peace agreement, and added that such a meeting was unlikely to happen by the end of August, as Ukraine has proposed. Washington's threat to impose new sanctions on Moscow is not making much dent in the Kremlin's decisions.

Cambodia-Thailand Conflict

A new border conflict is developing between Cambodia and Thailand in Southeast Asia. At dawn on July 24, tensions accumulated for months and finally exploded: a drone and six Cambodian soldiers were victims of a mine explosion, Cambodian soldiers opened fire against Thai positions, and within hours, the scenario was already one of open armed conflict between Thailand and Cambodia. It is reported that more than one hundred thousand people have already been displaced. President Trump called the leaders of both countries to mediate a cessation of hostilities, which originated from disputes that were already over a century old.

PRICE DYNAMICS

Crude oil prices, as in recent weeks, showed high volatility. In a struggle between events that pushed the market upward and those that, on the contrary, pressured the market downward, the latter ended up convincing the market.

After successfully negotiating a trade agreement between the United States and Japan, there was confidence that negotiations between Americans and the European Union would materialize in a deal based on relatively innocuous tariffs, which no longer seems imminent. August 1st continues to be a sword of Damocles as it is the date announced by Trump to apply high tariffs to countries that have not managed to negotiate other terms.

On Friday, news of an unexpected change in U.S. policy toward Venezuela influenced market perception, providing relief from oil sanctions. Additionally, the market did not prejudge what OPEC+ might announce in its Ministerial Committee meeting on Monday.

Specifically, at market close on Friday, July 25, 2025, Brent and WTI crude prices fell to $68.44 and $65.16/BBL, a discrete reduction of slightly more than 1.2% compared to the previous week's close.

VENEZUELA

Neither One Thing Nor the Other, But Quite the Opposite

The country had not finished digesting the implications of the hostage and prisoner exchange between Venezuela, El Salvador, and the United States, when, on Friday, social media began to insistently report that the Trump administration had granted, or was considering granting, a license in favor of the U.S. oil company, Chevron.

A Wall Street Journal report and reports from Bloomberg and Reuters agencies announced the news. Our sources confirmed the near certainty of the existence of this new license, granted just three and a half months after the cancellation of general license 41, and two months after the cancellation of all oil licenses granted by OFAC about Venezuelan hydrocarbons.

To date, there is no official confirmation from the U.S. government since, apparently, this time, it is a specific or private license that the U.S. government does not publish, and the company may or may not make it public. Hours later, Nicolás Maduro confirmed Chevron's return, and we should assume it will resume as operator and marketer of crude produced in the joint ventures in which it is a minority partner.

The supposed license details are unknown, but all kinds of speculation have appeared on different internet platforms, trying to guess the reasons and details of this apparent 180° turn by the U.S. government. Some commentators reported that, unlike the previous license, this time, royalties would be paid in kind (permitted by the current Hydrocarbons Law), as if to support the notion that funds would not reach Maduro this time. A not very serious argument, since royalty paid by any means is equivalent to its monetary value, and which, in any case, is a legal obligation of the joint venture that produces the crude.

Many commentators who try to explain this apparent change in U.S. policy focus on repeating arguments put forward for months by the oil lobby, Chevron's CEO, and influencer Laura Loomer, among others. They speak of the supposed need for Venezuelan heavy crude for U.S. refineries, the effect on the humanitarian crisis, the reduction or elimination of emigration, and ultimately preventing China and Russia from appropriating the Venezuelan oil market and assets. Some geopolitical arguments are exaggerated, and others are without much foundation. The humanitarian ones are based on the unfounded belief that the Venezuelan regime would use additional oil income for the population's benefit. And although those arguments did not convince the Trump administration in April, something seems to have changed, which we cannot analyze until we have the details of the supposed license.

Contradictions in U.S. Policy

As the Trump administration's capacity to astonish seems infinite, following news of the existence of a new license, that same Friday, OFAC issued a press release announcing that it was sanctioning the so-called "Cartel of the Suns" as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist." In the same statement, it described the "Cartel of the Suns" as a criminal group based in Venezuela, led by Nicolás Maduro Moros and other high-ranking Venezuelan officials of his regime, which provides material support to foreign terrorist organizations that threaten the peace and security of the United States, particularly Tren de Aragua and the Sinaloa Cartel.

"Today's action further exposes the illegitimate Maduro regime's facilitation of narcoterrorism through terrorist groups like the Cartel of the Suns," declared Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. "The Treasury Department will continue to fulfill President Trump's promise to prioritize the United States, taking strong action against violent organizations like Tren de Aragua, the Sinaloa Cartel, and their facilitators, like the Cartel of the Suns," the statement concluded.

This second administration decision does not appear to be coherent with the alleged granting of the license to Chevron. Granting a sanctions relief license to someone you catalog as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist" is not the first lack of coherence in negotiations and designations since Trump began his second term, nor is it necessarily a signal of what his final policy will be. Dawn will come, and we shall see.

Political Context

These events coincide with the first anniversary of the Maduro regime's non-recognition of the electoral results of July 28, 2024, which could be a simple coincidence but is infrequent in orthodox diplomacy. In any event, the Venezuelan opposition looks as surprised as the general public. María Corina Machado, even having cordial relations with Secretary of State Marco Rubio and with the ambassador in charge of Venezuelan affairs, John McNamara, seems to have been left out of this play.

Economic Situation

Venezuela's most relevant difficulty continues to be economic. To confront this, the country is deliberately kept in recession with the expectation that limited foreign currency income can finance the economy once it is contracted. This would have dramatic effects on private investment and trade, a sort of neoliberal package.

For now, public spending is restricted. There is no bank credit, and the allocation of official foreign currency is partially carried out with USDT, the cryptocurrency backed by Tether Limited, whose value is approximately $1.0. Maduro and his economic officials hope to be able to change this with the return of license relief.

However, if Chevron, and eventually perhaps other companies as well, manage to operate under a scheme similar to what they maintained before March, official economic policies would take a turn and try to put the country on a growth path similar to the first quarter of this year. The devaluation of the bolívar, which in the official market has already crossed the barrier of 120 Bs./$, could surely be stopped by managing the foreign exchange market, as was done when private oil companies went to money tables. What does seem improbable is that the oil industry will recover any sustainable growth path, given the objective conditions of the sector; ultimately, the new license would favor Chevron and the regime, not necessarily Venezuela.

Social and Internal Political Situation

Despite the hostage and prisoner exchange conducted, repression has intensified. A high number of people have been imprisoned or simply kidnapped, maintaining what human rights NGOs have called a "revolving door": maintaining or increasing the number of political prisoners despite having released some.

The municipal elections of July 27 appear to have little popular participation, and the government party, PSUV, anticipates obtaining 91% of the votes.

Binational Agreement with Colombia

Also newsworthy has been the signing of an agreement by President Gustavo Petro and Nicolás Maduro to create a binational zone on the border of the two countries. The zone would cover the departments of Norte de Santander, César, and La Guajira in Colombia and the states of Táchira and Zulia in Venezuela. In Colombia, this agreement was strongly criticized, alleging that Petro is not constitutionally empowered to sign the agreement and that the zone represents a loss of sovereignty to the armed guerrilla that has been operating on the Venezuelan side.

OIL OPERATIONS

All the informational noise did not affect operational activities except for some interruptions due to electrical supply problems.

Crude Production

Crude production during the last week averaged eight hundred forty-eight thousand barrels per day (848 Mbpd), distributed geographically as follows:

Area	Mbpd
West	212
East	120
Orinoco Belt	516
TOTAL	848

Refining

National refineries processed 202 Mbpd of crude and intermediate products, with a yield in terms of gasoline of 67 Mbpd and diesel of 71 Mbpd.

Upgraders

The PetroPiar upgrader is operating, and the crude produced, Hamaca Blend, is used partially as diluent for Belt crude, and the rest is sent to refining. The PetroCedeño upgrader continues to obtain intermediate products that are used as feedstock in refining. The PetroRoraima (PetroZuata) and PetroMonagas upgraders are not operable.

Petrochemical Sector

In the petrochemical sector, plant activity at the José complex has remained unchanged, although natural gas volume has been restricted, and Fertinitro's second train awaits natural gas availability.

Maduro announced that Venezuela is "agreeing on terms" to sell the Monómeros company, a subsidiary of Petroquímica de Venezuela S.A. (Pequiven), to the Colombian State. To this end, they have signed an information exchange agreement. Apparently, Petro wants the business to be managed under Ecopetrol's umbrella, provided an OFAC license is received.

Exports

Through Friday, July 25th, exports showed that all shipments were destined for China, generally through Malaysia. The volume dispatched is 14.2 MMbbls, equivalent to about 568 Mbpd, approaching the month's average once the three tankers scheduled through July 31st are dispatched. We estimate that the weighted price of exported crudes is in the order of $34.21/bbl.